The two, of course, are not mutually exclusive. While Morsi has spoken of a need to restore a battered Egyptian economy, neither he nor anyone else has been better able to provide stability or bread than the military was when it was running Egypt from February 2011 until June of this year.
On one level, they can be forgiven. The past year has seen certain post-Mubarak assumptions (or hopes) seriously ruptured. A popular Egyptian view of the military as protector of the nation was eroded. In February, more than 70 people died following a soccer match in Port Said at which security, the responsibility of the army, was conspicuous by its absence.
There was an elected parliament, one packed with Islamists, the results of which were later annulled. There was a presidential election that pitted President Morsi against former Mubarak Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq that saw Morsi walk off with the spoils. Neither option was enticing to Egypt's young revolutionaries, and in Morsi's victory – which was made possible by the Brotherhood breaking a promise not to run a candidate for president – there was evidence that the Islamist movement could not be taken at its word.
And, of course, there were clashes between protesters at Tahrir and at the presidential palace in Cairo, in the industrial towns of the Nile Delta, and once again in Port Said, along the country's economically vital Suez Canal. The constitution, which Egyptians were promised would be written by a truly representative body, was rushed through by Morsi and his allies over serious opposition towards the end of the year. When it came time for Egyptians to vote on it, it passed – but with less than 40 percent of the Egyptian electorate participating, many voters having lost hope that the political process was going to deliver anything of any tangible value to them or their families.