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“We’ll probably see much of the Libya model as this [Mali] intervention moves forward,” says Stephanie Pezard, an expert in West Africa and terrorism at the RAND corp. in Arlington, Va. “Just as in Libya, where it was the countries most concerned that were expected to take the lead, in this case there’s an understanding that France is the most concerned.”
But she says she expects the US “won’t be so far behind,” and that the intelligence resources the US is talking about providing “will be particularly useful when it comes to taking back the north” of Mali from the Islamists and pursuing militant fighters in the rugged Saharan terrain.
What Ms. Pezard does not expect to see is a significantly larger US involvement as a result of the Algerian hostage crisis. “I don’t think this crisis changes radically what the US already intended to do to support France” in Mali, she says.
The crisis does focus more international attention on the spread of Islamist militancy in North Africa, she adds. But she says that Americans and Westerners in general already knew that working and traveling in the area involved considerable risk.
Groups like AQIM – which is largely an Algerian organization and has operated for years there – have amassed the funds they’ve used to arm themselves through years of hostage-taking.
Pezard says Algeria has discouraged foreign intervention in the region’s increasingly chaotic and dangerous affairs for two key reasons: First, because it hoped to be a regional diplomatic kingpin, but also because it feared the impact that outside intervention – particularly by France, Algeria’s (and Mali’s) former colonial ruler – could have on restive local populations in the south.
“They’re afraid of seeing conflict spread to local populations, like the Touaregs,” who could end up demanding a southern state, she says.
What Algeria’s hostage crisis may indicate most clearly is that the sources of the region’s instability aren’t likely to dry up anytime soon.